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Abstract—In recent years, there have emerged many new hard-
ware mechanisms for improving the security of our computer
systems. Hardware offers many advantages over pure software
approaches: immutability of mechanisms to software attacks,
better execution and power efficiency and a smaller interface
allowing it to better maintain secrets. This has given birth to
a plethora of hardware mechanisms providing trusted execution
environments (TEEs), support for integrity checking and memory
safety and widespread uses of hardware roots of trust.
In this paper, we systematize these approaches through the lens
of abstraction. Abstraction is key to computing systems, and the
interface between hardware and software contains many abstrac-
tions. We find that these abstractions, when poorly designed, can
both obscure information that is needed for security enforcement,
as well as reveal information that needs to be kept secret, leading
to vulnerabilities. We summarize such vulnerabilities and discuss
several research trends of this area.
Index Terms—Hardware Security Primitives, Trusted Execu-
tion Environments
I. INTRODUCTION
The trustworthiness of a computer system entails that the
system can correctly fulfill tasks as intended by the user.
This can include user tasks (e.g., applications) and system
tasks (e.g., a system integrity monitor). Enabling techniques
for trustworthy execution can be implemented in software,
hardware or both. For instance, there exist proposals for both
software-based [17] and hardware-based [26] solutions for
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI); and likewise, isolation for code
can be achieved with either software (e.g., containerization and
sandboxing) or hardware components [109].
Nonetheless, there exists a common belief in hardware’s
advantages over software in consideration of the following
aspects: 1) Relative immutability. Tampering with hardware is
non-trivial and requires physical access. This makes hardware
support a necessity in mitigation techniques under a strong
adversarial model, e.g., rootkit-level threats [76] and hyper-
visor threats [66]. 2) Efficiency. Contrary to software that
introduces a layer of architectural abstraction, direct hardware
implementation can save redundant processing cycles (e.g.,
instruction decode). This allows for better efficiency for cer-
tain iterative/repetitive operations (e.g., consider how DSPs
outperform regular CPUs for signal processing). It can further
‡The work was started when the first author was at the University of
Toronto.
contribute to lowering power consumption, which is critical
for resource-constrained devices.
Furthermore, hardware is the Root of Trust (RoT) [48], as
it bridges the physical world (where human users reside) and
the digital world (where tasks run as software). To securely
perform a task or store a secret, the user trusts at least part of
the computer hardware.
Dedicated hardware security support has seen its prolif-
eration since the early days of computers. It can take a
straightforward form as discrete components to assist the
CPU, ranging from the industrial-grade tamper-responding
IBM Cryptocards (e.g., 4758 [37]), Apple’s proprietary secure
enclave processor (SEP [84]) for consumer electronics, to the
more open Trusted Platform Module (TPM), smart cards and
other security tokens. Meanwhile, architectural enhancements
are being introduced to the CPU, as well as its chipset, such
as Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs, see Section III),
the NX-bit, Intel MPX, MPK, etc.
Driven by demand over the few decades, hardware is being
“patched” cumulatively, as reflected in the increase of the
x86 ISA extensions (according to Baumann [10], hardware
is becoming the new software). The added complexity and
interaction between hardware features has led to numerous
problems, which has motivated us to reflect on the role of
hardware in security, and what key features make a good
hardware security mechanism.
Most hardware security features achieve their purpose by
hiding information or access from an entity, and/or exposing
a new/reduced interface to it. For instance, memory protection
between processes is implemented by virtual memory, which
prevents processes from accessing each other’s memory by
presenting each process with its own virtual address space.
The design of virtual memory can be considered an instance
of “abstraction” [22], [72], which 1) removes or attenuates
information (by hiding the true implementation of memory)
and 2) creates new semantics (such as page tables), which
are also called “abstractions”. Hence there is a relationship
between security and abstraction, which is particularly impor-
tant considering the heavy use of abstractions in computer
hardware to separate its implementation from that of the
software it runs.
We propose to use abstraction (Section II-A) as a lens
through which the workings of hardware security support
and various related issues are examined. Specifically, we
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find that: 1) beyond the commonly perceived immutability
and efficiency, the properties of hardware security support
can be explained as mechanisms that hide/expose something;
2) certain low-level attacks can be attributed to insufficient
(Section IV) or excess (Section V) abstraction.; and 3) many
proposals seek to leverage abstractions to increase security
(Section VI) or propose new abstractions to increase the
flow of information between hardware and software for better
security (Section VII).
While traditionally Trusted Computing [91] emphasizes
merely the protection for initial integrity and isolation during
execution, we expand the scope to be more holistic and to
ensure the eventual correct execution outcome. This includes
run-time dynamic aspects such as control/data flow integrity of
the running program and secure input/output. We also include
firmware in the processor, system chipset and peripheral
devices, which while they do not execute trusted application
software, are still nonetheless part of the trusted computing
base of much of that software. We examine how hardware-
enforced abstraction affects execution within this entire scope.
It is not our intention to focus on improper implementation
that fails to properly implement a specification. However, a
hardware-related fault may not clearly be attributable to either
a design flaw or an implementation error. We will not try to
draw a boundary (which might be difficult to do in any case).
Contributions.
1) We develop a general model for hardware security sup-
port based on the notion of abstraction, and examine
various Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) along
several key properties of the abstractions the TEEs pro-
vide.
2) We associate the extent of abstraction (excessive/insuffi-
cient) with the root cause of a series of vulnerabilities,
represented by side channels on one hand and insufficient
information flow on the other. Namely, when the abstrac-
tion specification does not hide all that is supposed to
be hidden, leaked information leads to attacks. On the
other hand, when such leakage is inevitable, too much
hiding across components also hinders effective reference
monitoring, which in turn leads to compromises.
3) We systematize the application of state-of-the-art hard-
ware security features and the proposal of new hardware
enhancements in the literature, based on their properties
from the perspective of abstraction.
II. MODEL OF TRUSTWORTHY EXECUTION
In this section, we explain our model of trustworthy execu-
tion, using abstraction as a way to analyze and understand the
various hardware support towards trustworthy execution that
has been implemented over the years. We begin by defining
abstraction in this context and show how it maps to the
operation of hardware. We then discuss its role in improving
hardware support for trustworthy execution.
A. Abstraction
In computer science, an abstraction can be thought of as a
model of a concrete artifact that retains the artifact’s essential
properties while eliding details of its implementation [72]. Ab-
straction is used heavily across the interface of components to
reduce the complexity of interactions across those components.
Thus, it is quite natural that abstraction is heavily used at
the interface between hardware and software, one of the most
complex interfaces in modern computing. Some key properties
of an abstraction, which is the interface created when one
abstracts a concrete implementation, are 1) the attenuation of
information and 2) the creation of new semantics. For example,
consider the implementation of modern processor caches:
1) Attenuation of information: Explicit access to and control
of cache memories is hidden, only revealing faster code
execution.
2) New semantics: Caches expose the abstraction of a cache
line, the size of the cache memory, a mapping function
between cache lines and memory and certain instruc-
tions (e.g., WBINVD/PREFETCH/CLFLUSH), which in-
fluence cache behavior.
From this example, we can see that abstraction both hides
and exposes information. Depending on the components in-
volved, what can be hidden is the existence of resources or
metadata. Other examples of hardware-software abstractions
include the processor ISA, which exposes the semantics of
an instruction for software to utilize hardware resources, but
hides implementation details such as pipelining, out-of-order-
execution and speculation.
We distinguish abstraction from isolation because while
both reduce the flow of information, total isolation as clas-
sically defined by Lampson [74] means that there is no infor-
mation flow at all, while abstraction merely attenuates it, still
allowing information to flow over the new semantics it defines.
Similarly, virtualization is a particular instance of abstraction,
which seeks to maintain one abstraction with a vastly different
implementation (i.e. backing RAM memories with disk).
The security concern with abstraction is that as hardware
has become a critical piece of security for software, hardware
abstractions have been thrust into a role for which they were
not explicitly designed, which is to provide access control
between mutually distrustful, actively malicious entities. Fail-
ures of these abstractions in this role can have disastrous
consequences. For example, the Meltdown/Spectre vulnerabil-
ities can be attributed to a failure in the ISA abstraction to
properly restrict memory accesses by one process to another
(or to the kernel), which we discuss in Section IV. In another
example, the hiding of information via the SMM abstraction
key information about the SMM region of memory from
flowing to reference monitors in the chipset and CPU caches,
allowing unauthorized access to SMM state, which we discuss
in Section V. From these examples, we can see that the correct
design of hardware abstractions is crucial to providing trust-
worthy execution environments, and it is through abstraction,
that we will analyze and model TEEs in this paper.
2
B. Execution Environments
While the ISA abstraction describes the abstraction over
which software can use hardware resources, the more general
interface that describes all interactions between software and
hardware is the Execution Environment (EE), which includes
not just the ISA, but other abstractions, such as concurrency
and level of confinement.
We call an EE that implements trustworthy execution a TEE.
What is trustworthy execution? Trustworthy execution is an
execution system whose goal is the correct execution of a task
(as opposed to endpoint security, which concerns the whole
computing device). As such, the goal of trustworthy execution
can be subdivided into two sub-goals:
• Initial integrity: If the task is started wrong, no correct
execution can be expected. Related to this, one TEE may
invoke another TEE and propagate trust to it using a chain
of trust.
• Run-time security: Once started, the task is subject to
both attacks from the outside and misbehavior of internal
code. Such attacks may seek to directly subvert the task
or indirectly exploit a defect in the task to subvert it. If
such attacks are successful, then the task will not execute
correctly.
Several properties of TEEs are relevant to their ability to
provide trustworthy execution. As such, these properties can
form a basis for evaluating and comparing TEEs to see if
they are “fit for purpose”. The following are major security
properties we consider for TEEs:
1) Initial integrity assurance. This describes how the TEE
provides initial integrity, and in general, comes in one of
two forms: static image integrity and launch integrity. The
former checks only the image at installation (or update)
time, applying mostly to firmware update mechanisms,
while the latter checks both the image and initial inputs
right before execution.
2) Addressing/memory protection. This describes both what
memory the TEE can access, and whether its memory
can be accessed by other EEs. This determines the
advantage/disadvantage of a TEE, i.e., if defense code
is hosted inside, to what extent it can be protected from
being manipulated (integrity) or even seen (confidential-
ity) from outside, and at the same time, what ability it
has to monitor or control the execution of other EEs.
3) Scope. This determines whether the TEE is per-logical
processor (LP), per-core, per-CPU or per-system. For
example, it is possible to see whether a task is in an
SGX enclave or not at the granularity of an LP, as the
CREG CR_ENCLAVE_MODE which indicates this exists
for each LP [23]. In contrast, TrustZone is per-system as
a single NS bit, which is propagated from the main bus
to the APB (peripheral) bridge [97], exists for the entire
system.
4) Developer access. This describes whether the TEE is de-
signed to run third party, possibly untrusted or malicious
code.
Note that we explicitly exclude the ISA-defined notion of
privilege-level (i.e. the current privilege level (CPL) or “Ring
level” in x86) from these properties. This is because, with
regards to security, the traditional hierarchy of ISA privilege
has become less relevant, as they are not absolute (i.e. Ring
0 provides different protection levels depending on whether
it is between a kernel and a user process, or a kernel and a
VMM), and it is no longer a strict hierarchy (SGX enclaves
run at Ring 3 but still resistant to Ring-0 code and ARM
privileges are orthogonal to the secure/non-secure status).
There are a number of ISA extensions that serve to hide
or restrict information flow, but do not form a complete
TEE as they do not provide all the abstractions necessary
to execute code. For example, Intel SMEP/SMAP [59] (or
ARM PXN [2]) can only be used to restrict the addressing
capabilities of privileged code, while Intel MKTME [61] (cf.
TME) lacks proper addressing isolation from outside code they
do not protect. Thus, these can be viewed as extensions to
existing EEs.
III. TRUSTWORTHY EXECUTION WITH TEES
In this section, we examine several well known TEEs
and formally categorize them into Attested Trusted Execution
Environments, firmware TEEs and Chained TEEs. The TEEs
we examine and their properties are summarized in Table I.
The “Type” column indicates which of the 3 categories each
TEE belongs to, and the other 4 columns correspond to
the 4 properties of TEEs discussed in Section II-B. The
“Accessible By” column gives addressing/memory protection
as a relationship between the TEEs by indicating which TEE
can access which ones according to their intended design (i.e.
not taking into account vulnerabilities). The access here refers
to read/write access to the execution memory of the TEE in
question, and for this reason, we include only the x86 TEEs
for comparability (e.g., excluding ARM TrustZone).
A. Attested Trusted Execution Environments
We define Attested Trusted Execution Environments to
include environments that are traditionally thought of as TEEs,
such as SGX, TXT, or TrustZone. Today’s processor architec-
tures usually support one or multiple attested TEEs (even on
MCU-like platforms, e.g., TrustZone profile M [98], [123]).
The defining features that separate attested TEEs from other
TEEs are that attested TEEs provide launch initial integrity
and attestation capabilities.
Initial Integrity. Attested TEEs implement launch integrity
through explicit measurements upon code loading and data
sealing. Moreover, the code loading process also measures the
integrity of the environment of the attested TEE, including any
other software loaded up to that point. TXT/SVM achieves
this by collaborating with the TPM chip (firmware-based, in-
tegrated or discrete) as secure storage. The program (including
the SINIT module) being loaded is first measured by the CPU,
and the measurement is stored in TPM’s volatile memory
(Platform Configuration Registers) in the form of hash values.
If the hash values do not match with the preset values in TPM’s
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TEE Type Scope Init integrity Accessible by Dev
¶ Microcode F CPU Launch
· ME / PSP (-3) F System Static
¸ S3 Boot Script1 F System Static ¶·¹º»¼½
¹ SMM (-2) F CPU Static ¶
N
º TXT / SVM A System Launch ¶¸¹
» VMM (-1) C System X ¶·¸¹º
¼ SEV-ES (0) A N/A Launch ¶·
½ OS (0) C N/A X ¶·¸¹º»
Ł Application (3) C LP X ¶·¸¹º»¼½
¿ SGX (3) A LP Launch ¶
Y
TABLE I
PROPERTIES OF EXAMPLE EXECUTION ENVIRONMENTS ON X86. C=CHAINED TEES, F=FIRMWARE TEES, AND A=ATTESTED TEES.
non-volatile memory (policies in NVRAM indices), execution
will be aborted. SGX has this functionality implemented as
part of the microarchitecture extension (i.e., inside the CPU),
without relying on TPM (in the MRENCLAVE field of the
protected memory instead, but non-volatile secrets reside in
the SPI chip on the motherboard). Data sealing ensures that
a piece of data can only be retrieved on a specific platform
when a specific program is running. This is implemented by
encrypting and decrypting the sealed data with a key derived
from secrets in the hardware and program measurements.
Memory Protection. Attested TEEs also have stronger mem-
ory protection. The way memory protection is implemented
depends on whether the attested TEE is exclusive or con-
current. A concurrent TEE coexists with the unprotected
portion of the system (e.g., in a time-sliced fashion), while
an exclusive TEE preempts other code and then destroys the
execution context before allowing other code to run.
Concurrent attested TEEs, such as SGX, have special pro-
cessor mechanisms to provide strong isolation from other EEs,
such as both privileged and unprivileged EEs on the same
system. SGX has its enclave memory allocated in the Enclave
Page Cache (EPC) which is part of the Processor Reserved
Memory range (PRM). The PRM’s protection is enforced by
the CPU against access from any other software (including
SMM) and DMA. A unique feature of SGX is that the enclave
memory is fully encrypted when exposed outside the CPU
with the MEE (Memory Encryption Engine, part of the CPU
uncore), immune to various (physical) memory attacks, e.g.,
the cold-boot attack [49]. Thus even in the case of exposure
from the EPC (e.g., when EPC pages are evicted into regular
DRAM), memory content is only seen as ciphertext.
In contrast, exclusive TEEs do not need to defend against
concurrent software threats and as a result, for these Attested
TEEs, the main focus of memory protection is to defend
against DMA access from peripherals and physical memory
attacks. An Attested TEE such as TXT relies on Intel’s
IOMMU technology VT-d to protect its MLE from being
accessed via DMA, by including the memory ranges in the
DMA Protected Range (DPR) and Protected Memory Regions
(PMRs) [58]. SVM also has AMD’s Device Exclusion Vector
(DEV) support [3] for the same purpose. Both TXT and SVM
are vulnerable to the cold-boot attack and accessible by SMM,
unlike SGX. This can be an example of low-privilege TEEs
having stronger protection than perceived from their assigned
privilege.
Scope. Attested TEEs vary in scope. Many of the earlier at-
tested TEEs, such as TXT, SVM and TrustZone encompassed
the entire system, while SGX is per logical processor. This re-
flects SGX’s goal to be lighter-weight while the other attested
TEEs were seen to be an entire virtual machine, complete
with its own OS. However, system-wide TEEs, especially
TrustZone, take advantage of their system-wide property by
being able to have trusted and possibly exclusive access to
hardware peripherals. Most system-wide TEEs are exclusive,
in that they cannot execute concurrently with another OS.
However, TrustZone [97], [103] (the traditional profile A) is
an exception, thanks to its I/O partitioning capability. With the
TrustZone Address Space Controller (TZASC) [97], memory-
mapped devices can be dynamically partitioned [79], e.g., a
part of the screen dedicated to the secure world, allowing
concurrent access by both the TrustZone OS and an untrusted-
OS running outside TrustZone. We note that in the context
of Attested TEEs, system-wide TEEs are thought of as priv-
ileged TEEs (pTEE), because they can run privileged code,
while local-process TEEs, such as SGX, are thought of as
unprivileged TEEs (uTEEs).
Developer Access. Universally, Attested TEEs are meant to be
open environments that allow arbitrary developer code to be
executed in them. As such, Attested TEEs also provide attesta-
tion, where the Attested TEE can sign the code measurements
taken at launch with a trusted key to assert to another party the
identity of the code executing within the Attested TEE. For
system-wide Attested TEEs, this comes in the form of remote
attestation, as it attests the identity of the entire system to the
1We use the S3 boot script as an example to demonstrate typical protection
level for BIOS/UEFI firmware.
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remote party. LP-scoped Attested TEEs like SGX, are capable
of both local attestation to other code on the same system, as
well as remote attestation to code on other systems.
B. Firmware Trusted Execution Environments
Firmware is software that implements functionality that is
logically part of the hardware. As a result, while it is software,
it is implicitly (axiomatically) trusted just like real hardware.
Unlike Attested TEEs which can be considered alternative EEs
that implement trustworthy execution for software that requires
it, firmware is part of the trusted computing base (TCB) of all
software, as it is responsible for critical system operations.
Firmware exists in various components of a computer
system, which has an effect on where the firmware executes.
System firmware (sFW) executes on the main CPU. This
generally refers to BIOS/UEFI firmware, which performs the
early (but complex) initialization before bootloaders [18] and
the OS. However, sFW is not confined to only boot time—
SMI handlers (in System Management Mode) and UEFI
Boot Scripts (upon S3 wakeup), continue to run even after
system boot is complete. sFW also includes CPU firmware,
which is used to implement various instructions that may
be called by software. Chipset firmware (cFW) executes on
a separate dedicated processor, often microcontrollers in a
system’s I/O subsystem, or in co-processors on the system
board or system-on-chip (SoC). Examples of cFW include
the firmware for the Intel Management Engine (ME), AMD
Secure Processor (previously PSP) and the baseband processor
on mobile phones. Finally, Device firmware (dFW) executes
on a dedicated processor as part of a peripheral. The distinction
from cFW here is that these devices are even more isolated
from the host CPU, often accessed over a well-defined bus
interface, which narrows the possible interactions between the
firmware and untrusted code on the host CPU, e.g., SATA, PCI
Express and USB. An example of dFW could be the firmware
on a hard drive or network card. Another distinction is that
the sFW and cFW are usually stored in non-volatile RAM that
is shared with other sFW or cFW, or may even be loaded off
disk and inserted by the BIOS or OS. On the other hand, dFW
is almost universally stored on the peripheral device.
There are a large number of firmware TEEs with diverse
properties, and we do not discuss each for the sake of space,
but highlight some notable firmware TEEs for each property.
Initial Integrity. One property common to all firmware TEEs
is that they provide static integrity as opposed to launch
integrity like attested TEEs. This means that the integrity of
their code is only checked when it is updated and not when
they are executed. There are a few exceptions to this rule. Both
S-CRTM (Static Code Root of Trust for Measurement) [47]
and UEFI Secure Boot [121] will measure certain firmware
such as Option ROMs (which are device-specific firmware
executed during boot to initialize a peripheral) during boot.
S-CRTM stores these measurements in the PCRs on a TPM,
making them available for remote attestation. UEFI secure
boot, on the other hand, verifies the ROMs against some
specified policy. Finally, CPU microcode is loaded from the
BIOS and verified on each boot.
Memory Protection. Each firmware TEE has its own custom
memory protection mechanism. The mechanisms may also
permit access by some TEEs while denying access by others.
Table I lists which TEEs are able to access other TEEs. For
instance, CPU microcode is able to access all other TEEs as it
helps enforce the ISA abstraction, while its own internal state
(e.g., the SRAM) is invisible (abstracted away) to the rest of
the system. Intel ME as chipset firmware is not accessible by
other TEEs (with shared memory encrypted). For management
purposes, it has access to most part of the system with the
exception of SMM and TXT. SMRAM is protected by the ISA
(see Section IV for attacks) and only exposed to microcode.
The S3 boot script is a special case in firmware TEEs but
represents certain other UEFI modules: it is granted access to
the whole system memory and I/O (to resume the pre-sleep
machine state) but where it resides is open to any privileged
code (if UEFI LockBox is not implemented).
Scope. In view of the special nature of firmware TEEs, we dis-
cuss their scope as follows. CPU Microcode runs underneath
(and helps create) the ISA abstraction. Its scope can be consid-
ered the entire CPU. Intel ME (or similar chipset technologies)
has one instance and coordinates the whole computer system,
regardless of other code on the main processor(s). Therefore
we consider ME’s scope to be System. Certain UEFI/BIOS
modules handle specific system stages (e.g., self-check, power
state switching, and device initialization), during the inactivity
of other tasks on the main processor(s). Hence the S3 boot
script’s scope is assigned System.
Proper scope can ensure a firmware TEE, if used to host
defense code, of sufficient coverage for enforcement. For
example, mechanisms based on Intel ME are able to overwatch
code of various privileges on different processors in the
system. On other hand, mechanisms using SMM in a multi-
processor environment must consider interaction with other
processors, as SMI processing is per-processor [27].
Developer Access. Another distinguishing property between
firmware TEEs and Attested TEEs is that Attested TEEs were
inherently designed to host developer code, while firmware
TEEs are designed for the exclusive use of code belonging
to the device or platform manufacturer, and as such, are not
open execution environments. As a result, firmware TEEs lack
features like remote attestation, and even the specific instances
where their measurements are included in attestations were
bolted on as after-thoughts to increase the trustworthiness of
those attestation by encompassing more of the TCB of the
host. There have been some academic proposals to inject code
via non-officially supported methods into a firmware TEE to
improve host security overall (in particular SMM). We discuss
these in Section VI.
C. Chained Trusted Execution Environments
Some EEs do not inherently provide trustworthy execution,
mainly because they do not provide initial integrity and are
not designed to provide run-time security. However, such
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EEs can be turned into TEEs by chaining trust and adding
secure functionality. For example, kernel mode execution is
not innately a TEE, but if we boot a verified secure OS (such
as SEL4 [67] for example), and chain trust to it by attesting
it using a lower-level TEE such as TXT or a TPM, then the
kernel mode EE becomes a TEE. We call TEEs created in this
manner “chained TEEs”.
Initial Integrity. The initial TEE to execute is called the Root
of Trust (RoT) as it is trusted by fiat. It can then chain that
trust to other EEs to make them into TEEs using the following
sequence of rough steps:
(a) Establish a mechanism to check and protect the next
EE.
(b) Ensure that the EE’s coverage is sufficient for the
intended task.
(c) Transfer execution to the checked/protected EE and
optionally repeat by going to (a).
For example, an initial TEE (e.g., UEFI, as the Root-of-Trust
TEE) boots the OS as the next TEE with Secure Boot or Boot
Guard, and then the OS can check and run an appropriate
anti-virus tool. Most Attested TEEs can act as the Root-of-
Trust TEEs. In “late launch” technologies (Intel TXT and
AMD SVM), the privileged TEE backed by hardware directly
bootstraps an OS/VMM without relying on UEFI/BIOS; fur-
thermore, an unprivileged TEE (uTEE, e.g., Intel SGX) can
securely bootstrap the ultimate user task skipping also the
OS/VMM. Note that in both cases above, legacy firmware
still remains part of the TCB to a certain extent, but is not
the Root-of-Trust TEE for the chain of trust establishment.
Memory Protection, Scope and Developer Access. Such
chained TEEs are generally the VMM, OS or application
code (if trust is chained from the privilege layers below).
As such, their memory protection and scope are that of the
VMM, OS or application code depending on the program
being executed and configuration. We do not consider the
scope of the OS (correspondingly the SEV/ES), as one OS
may span processors/LPs but there can be multiple instances in
the case of virtual machine guests (under a VMM). In general,
these systems derive memory protection through the processor
MMU and are system-wide for the VMM, and limited to a
logical processor for an application. All are open EEs and
support the execution of developer-specified code.
D. TEEs across architectures
In light of the importance of TEEs in establishing (the chain
of) trust for a computing platform, we review the presence and
positioning of TEEs across mainstream architectures (refer to
Table II). ARM (most mobile platforms), x86 (most PCs and
servers) and mainframes (aka, System Z, e.g., in data centers)
are included.
Observations. We notice that the positioning of TEEs reflects
the purpose of the corresponding platform. ARM/x86 aim
2As of this writing, no official documentation or public information is
available for ARM Bowmore, a technology for isolating individual workloads.
We note it here for completeness.
TABLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF EES ACROSS DIFFERENT PLATFORMS (EXAMPLES).
⇐= more integration more offloading/discreteness =⇒
EE
Arch ARM x86 System Z
dFW Stand-alone
entities
HMC
SE
CSS
CU
Director/Switch
Characterizable
Processors
zIIP
IFL
ICF
cFW Apps on
co-processors
AMT
PAVP
fTPM
i390 code
(on SAPs)
CFCC
(on ICF)
Co-processors
Baseband
Apple SEP
SCP/MCP
Intel ME
AMD PSP
SAP
IFP
sFW Various SMM PR/SM
Privilege
system EL/PL0–3 Ring0–3 16 keys x 2 states
pTEE TrustZone
Intel TXT
AMD SVM
AMD SEV
uTEE Planned2 Intel SGX
Refer to Appendix for the glossary and further explanation.
to be tightly integrated, migrating more towards few co-
processors that are either on the board or even on a “system
on chip” ; while System Z aims to be highly modular, and
contains many discrete components. Compared to commodity
platforms like ARM and x86, System Z trades-off cost for
greater security, availability, reliability and performance. To
reduce the chance of single point of failure and to offload
processing to task-specific components, mainframes like Sys-
tem Z have the following distinctions in terms of TEEs:
• Offloading to co-processors. System Z is a coprocessor-
rich platform [122]. There are basically two types of co-
processors: 1) Unconfigured generic processors. Physical
processor units (PUs) are shipped generically and must
be configured (characterized [53]) by the customer for a
purpose, such as zIIP (for Java and database workloads)
and IFL (for Linux workloads). 2) Configured processors.
Certain PUs are configured with a default purpose by the
vendor (corresponding to co-processors on x86/ARM),
e.g., IFP runs firmware that is specific to certain PCIe fea-
tures. These co-processors contribute to the performance
and availability of System Z.
• Stand-alone components. Components that are usually
integrated on PCs take the form of one or multiple stand-
alone devices on System Z, e.g., BMC (on-board) vs. the
Hardware Management Console and the Support Element
(a separate laptop).
• Full-stack implementation. Furthermore, compared to
regular containers (LXC/Docker) which share the un-
derlying abstraction layers up to the OS, IBM Secure
Service Container (SSC [54]) has its dedicated hardware,
firmware and OS in a physical box.
• Fine-grained privilege levels. There are 16 storage access
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keys (combined with the 2 states/privileges), assigned to
different workloads individually. This forms an architec-
tural support for fine-grained privileges.
To maximize security out of co-located entities (as a result
of integration for portability), ARM/x86 tends to have rich
support for Attested TEEs, which are intended for isolation
(enhancing abstraction) in a shared computing environment.
IV. ABSTRACTION UNDERDONE
As an important form of trust establishment, TEEs are
expected to abstract information away sufficiently from des-
ignated entities (hence achieving protection). However, even
if the hardware implementation complies with the abstraction
specification (e.g., an ISA), information can still be leaked
in one way or another. We now examine how insufficient
abstraction opens the door for attacks.
Side channels. The term side-channel attack originated from
cryptography [69]. It has been used to refer to secret ex-
traction from unintended channels such as timing, power,
electromagnetic and acoustic channels. We generalize the
side channel and define it as an unauthorized communication
channel caused by implementation details that are not specified
by the abstraction specification, such as algorithm, protocol,
architecture and interface standard.
A TEE may have been properly implemented regarding
what should be hidden and what should be exposed, but it has
been shown in multiple incidents that the intended abstraction
is insufficient.
Synchronousness. As side channels imply the presence of
another entity (the adversary), whether that entity simultane-
ously and actively extracts information from the victim code
determines the synchronousness.
Exclusive attested TEEs (with the scope of System) are
naturally immune to synchronous side-channel attacks, as they
do not execute in the presence of any other software. We do
not consider physical side channels here (e.g., power analysis
attacks [62]). This is also reflected in the fact that almost all
concurrent TEEs suffer from side-channel attacks to a certain
extent (see Section IV-B).
As for exclusive firmware TEEs, direct run-time side-
channel attacks are not applicable. However, attacks caused by
improper protection of their memory (when inactive) are com-
mon, as exemplified by the attacks discussed in Section IV-C.
A. Micro-architectural side channels
The processor architecture (e.g., the ISA) forms an abstrac-
tion layer between software and hardware. When the ISA
specification is complied with, side channels caused by the
underlying implementation are micro-architectural.
Most micro-architectural side channels are timing-based,
i.e., extracting information by measuring temporal charac-
teristics of architectural artifacts. This is because while the
ISA abstraction specifies instructions and visible architectural
resources like registers, it does not provide an abstraction
for timing, instead allowing the underlying implementation
to determine operational delays in the interest of maximizing
performance.
There are two aspects to such side channels:
• Information extraction. Certain (mis)behaviors effectively
convert micro-architectural data to architectural, to be
extracted. Two subcategories exist: 1) Memory content.
The wide variety of cache-based side channels exploit
the sharing of different cache levels to derive secrets
from cache access (hits or misses), as represented by
Prime+Probe [101] and Flush+Reload [130]. In addi-
tion to regular cache, the Translation Lookaside Buffer
(TLB) as the cache for the Memory Management Unit
(MMU) also leaks information (e.g., TLBleed [43]). Such
indicates the abstraction flaw of cache memory beyond
the ISA. 2) Execution metadata. The CPU’s Execution
Unit, if not properly abstracted, can leak diverse metadata
about ongoing execution. PortSmash [1] can time the
contention latency of execution engine ports, and infer
instruction traces based on port assignment difference.
Nemesis [117] learns the current instruction in execution
according to interrupt handling latency. Note that memory
content can be further extracted based on the execution
metadata.
• Channel control. Incomplete abstraction can also enable
the attacker to better control what is leaked over the side
channel. For example, vulnerabilities like Meltdown [82]
and Spectre [68] exploit the incomplete abstraction of
speculative execution to select what information is leaked
with greater probability over cache-based channels (for
the actual information extraction).
B. (In)security of concurrent Attested TEEs
Most attested TEE side channels are also micro-architectural
side channels with certain adaptation specific to the Attested
TEE.
SGX heavily suffers from side-channel attacks due to
its concurrent but unprivileged nature, ranging from branch
shadowing [78], cache attacks [12], SgxPectre [19] to the
fatal Foreshadow attack [14]. There exist also mature SGX-
specific compromise tools to facilitate attacks, e.g., SGX-
Step [116] that single-steps enclave code. All in all, regular
side channels might be alleviated by programmer diligence and
involving another root anchor (e.g., Intel TSX [20], [108]), and
Foreshadow is patchable (although its long-term influence is
an open question). TrustZone, as a concurrent attested TEE is
also vulnerable despite its ability to run privileged OS code.
Side channels have been identified as in TruSpy [140] and
TruSense [141]. Nevertheless, AutoLock [44] demonstrates
that they might be more difficult than expected. SEV, which
enhances VM guests with memory encryption, is vulnerable to
secret extraction attacks [93], [94], due to a malicious VMM
being able to execute concurrently with a victim VM.
C. Abstraction for firmware TEEs
Compared to the abstractions used to construct Attested
TEEs, firmware TEEs have comparatively simple abstractions
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as they tend to execute exclusively and tend to have very little
interaction with application code in the host CPU. Instead,
the abstraction failures tend to lead to lapses in access control
that allow adversaries to corrupt firmware TEEs, leading to
compromises of the initial integrity of firmware TEEs. We
survey several documented instances of such lapses below.
System Management Mode (SMM): System Management
Interrupt (SMI) handlers are stored in a RAM region called
SMRAM, which is protected by the CPU at all times (as
in the abstraction specification). The content of the SMRAM
determines the initial integrity of the SMM TEE (after loaded
from the SPI flash).
In early motherboards, access was possible from any kernel-
privileged code, because previously the D_LOCK bit in the
SMRAM Control Register (SMRAMC) was not taken care of
by the BIOS.3 Later, SMI handler compromise could take
several forms (in addition to the SPI reflash attacks [64], [107],
[128]): 1) through the memory reclaiming mechanism (e.g.,
intended for saving space wasted by MMIO) [106] (patched on
certain machines). Note that remapping is locked in Intel TXT
mode [55]. 2) cache poisoning [34], [127]: access to improp-
erly cached SMRAM content (fixed with the SMRR register).
3) SMM callout vulnerabilities [5]: SMI handler branches
outside of SMRAM (fixable with SMM_Code_Chk_En).
4) attacking argument passing to SMI handlers [11]: tricking
the SMI handler to overwrite SMRAM. See Section V-A for
attack details. All these are to do with (previously) unspecified
aspects between the SMM TEE and the rest of the system.
UEFI Boot Script (which is run when the system wakes
up from S3 sleep) can also be altered maliciously [124], thus
allowing arbitrary code execution. The root cause is that the
EFI variables or their copies (in this case a pointer to the Boot
Script) are not properly protected. An attack on UEFI Secure
Boot [65] was based on a similar approach (i.e., modifying an
EFI variable storing the boot policy).
Microcode: x86 microcode updates are initiated by writing
to model-specific registers (MSRs) and accepted after certain
cryptographic verification.4 An early documented attempt was
found in an anonymous report [4] which showed an example of
abstraction underdone that even if only vendor-verified updates
are allowed, an attacker in control of this process can still
choose to patch microcode lines that facilitate his attack (there
are multiple slots available).
cFW TEEs. Chipset FW TEEs, on the other hand, can suffer
from inadequate abstraction both at run-time (synchronous)
or when inactive (asynchronous), due to their concurrency on
another processor while sharing the code storage with the main
processor.
Intel Management Engine (ME): ME’s intended function-
ality for full-control out-of-band management requires bulk
data transfer capability (in addition to HECI for signalling or
small amount of data) with the main processor. Therefore,
3Once D_LOCK is set, SMRAMC becomes read-only irreversibly until reboot,
locking down D_OPEN (which makes SMRAM visible.)
4Microcode patches are not persistent and are reloaded during the early
boot process (e.g., from CPUCODE.BIN in the SPI flash).
DMA is constantly active via a mechanism called UMA
(Unified Memory Architecture), which is used between the
GPU and the CPU. Due to the limited memory space on
the ME processor, it uses the UMA region (like stealing
part of the host memory) as its execution RAM [110]. This
opens up an attack vector. Researchers have already started
their exploration since the early days of ME (see [114] by
Tereshkin and Wojtczuk). Basically, the approach was similar
to that of the SMM compromise: remapping the ME UMA
region (otherwise protected) to be accessible by the main CPU.
Fortunately (or unfortunately for the defense-purpose commu-
nity) Intel introduced UMA protection for both integrity and
confidentiality (using encryption) [105].
dFW TEEs. Contrary to sFW and cFW, dFW does not share
the processor or the code storage, and is exposed to the
main processor only through a (limited) peripheral interface.
Therefore, dFW’s security rests less on abstractions in the
processor and more on those at their interface.
A recent analysis of the (in)security of today’s Self-
Encrypting Drives (SEDs) identified several vulnerabili-
ties [88] (similar to regular SSDs). Worryingly, not all attacks
require physical access— software-only reflashing attacks us-
ing undocumented vendor-specific commands (VSCs)5 could
potentially be performed after a privilege escalation. The
attacker’s code would remain on the peripheral even if the
operating system is wiped and re-installed.
Indeed, dFW has been a battlefront for attacks for decades.
Examples are not rare, e.g., hard-drive backdoor [135], net-
work cards [36] and video cards. Zhang et al. proposed
IOCheck [138] using SMM to monitor and verify the in-
tegrity of the firmware of various devices. Hendricks and van
Doorn [51] gave a very high-level description of how device
firmware can be verified in a trustworthy manner. However,
the implementation of their proposal remains an open problem,
largely due to the heterogeneity of the devices.
V. ABSTRACTION OVERDONE
From the discussion in Section IV, we see that abstractions
can still allow information flow in unintended ways, resulting
in side channels across shared (though logically separated)
hardware resources (e.g., processors sharing the same last-
level cache, firmware TEEs sharing the same SPI flash chip,
etc.). Conversely, we also find that abstractions, in their goal
to attenuate information flows, sometimes go too far and hide
information that needs to flow. In many cases, this results
in a hardware reference monitor enforcing an incomplete
policy due to incomplete information. We call this “Abstraction
Overdone”, and analyze some examples of this phenomenon
in this section.
A. Insufficient information flow for enforcement
By design, the CPU maintains a number of registers (or
state information in other forms) that are internal, and the
chipset also has its own internal state, e.g., in the case of the
5These VSCs are like regular commands sent through the SATA or NVMe
interface.
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PCH (Platform Controller Hub). Some of the previous attacks
exploited such asymmetric information, e.g., different views
between the CPU and the chipset.
With Intel, there is a mechanism to reclaim the memory lost
to MMIO below 4GB, exposing two registers REMAPBASE
and REMAPLIMIT in the Memory Controller Hub (MCH, aka
the NorthBridge) [55]. At the same time, critical regions, such
as the SMRAM region should not be remapped and exposed
to any software running on the CPU. However, the abstraction
of SMM says that this mechanism should not be exposed to
any components outside of the CPU (or even software on
the CPU), and as a result, the chipset is not aware of this
restriction (e.g., remap should be checked against SMBASE,
a Model-Specific Register). Rutkowska and Wojtczuk [106]
found that this omitted information flow allows SMRAM
to be remapped using the reclaiming mechanism and made
accessible to code on the CPU, which is a violation of
SMM’s security guarantees. A strikingly similar vulnerabil-
ity was found against the seemingly more powerful Intel
ME, by remapping part of the Unified Memory Architecture
(UMA) using the same reclaiming mechanism6 (see [114]).
Even though later Intel introduced UMA protection so that
this region is fully encrypted [38], it does not address the
root cause, which is that abstractions prevent the reclaiming
mechanism from checking remapping requests against some
global list of sensitive memory ranges. With AMD, there is
still no exception: the Input Output Remap Registers (IORRs)
can be used to achieve the same purpose [142].
Caching is another abstraction where insufficient informa-
tion flow has resulted in vulnerabilities. Code running on
the CPU can determine whether/how memory regions can be
cached, through the Memory-Type Range Registers (MTRRs).
However, since the MCH does not see more than what is spec-
ified by MTRRs, it is unaware of memory access restrictions
similar to the reclaiming mechanism. For example, a cache
poisoning attack proposed by Duflot et al. [34] and again
by Wojtczuk and Rutkowska [127], found that an adversary
could modify the “exposed” SMI handler while it resided in
the cache without accessing the SMRAM directly.7 On the
next invocation, the modified SMM handler will run. Duflot
et al. also discussed a more efficient scheme to make the attack
persistent and not confined by the cached size. Both assumed
that the original SMI handler did not flush caches before
the RSM instruction. The fix for this problem is the System-
Management Range Register SMRR [59], which complements
the MTRRs by allowing the chipset to specify memory ranges
that should not be cached (and can only be modified while the
processor is in SMM).
If we examine how SMM attacks and defenses have evolved
over the past decade (Figure 1), we see that it has been an
arms race. Namely, SMRAM is supposed to be protected,
but what would be the defense vectors depends on what has
6ME requires UMA for run-time storage, due to the limited memory
capacity of its own microcontroller.
7We see some indication [31], [42] that Intel was also likely aware to some
extent of these vulnerabilities before their public disclosure.
been discovered by the community, gradually in an attack-
driven manner. While the MTRRs allowed information about
the SMM memory range to cross the privileged-code EE
abstraction to the OS kernel, the abstracted interface between
the chipset and the CPU did not transmit this information until
the SMRR was added. In every instance, the root cause can
be attributed to an overly strong abstraction preventing infor-
mation about an access policy from flowing to the appropriate
reference monitor.
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Fig. 1. The arduous journey of SMM defences.
VI. PROPOSED TEE-BASED SECURITY APPROACHES
Defending against malicious code from outside (as defined
in Section II-B) is usually the primary goal of security
solutions (while avoiding internal code misbehavior can be the
next step). This largely depends on TEEs that abstract away
information/access from malicious code, e.g., in the form of
memory protection or isolation. In this section, we look at
proposals that use TEEs to improve the security of systems.
Usage 1: Exclusive pTEEs for initial integrity with a
lightweight mechanism for run-time protection. A num-
ber of solutions use privileged TEEs (pTEEs) to securely
bootstrap the system into a good state, then hook critical
operations together with metadata with a run-time mechanism.
The rationale is as follows: 1) pTEE’s exclusiveness and
load-time integrity measurement is used to bootstrap trust.
2) The exclusiveness determines no monitored code can run
in parallel, while switching back and forth with the monitored
code imposes significant overhead, which is common for
Attested TEEs. Note that hosting the whole solution/system
inside the pTEE is infeasible either due to bloated TCB.
3) Therefore, for run-time protection, a common practice is to
choose a hardened but lightweight mechanism. For example,
SMRAM’s memory protection (inaccessible when SMM is not
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active) ensures continued integrity, and SMI’s non-maskability
enables it to preempt and monitor the rest of the system in a
way that cannot be disabled.
Hypervisor integrity: HyperSafe [120] makes use of tboot
(which is actually based on Intel TXT) to bootstrap a solution
for hypervisor integrity protection. It achieves a hardware-
based memory lockdown for hypervisor pages by first pro-
tecting the pages with W⊕X, then trapping any writes to page
tables with the WP bit in CR0. The enforcement logic (e.g.,
unlocking) is implemented in the page fault handler. Here the
initial integrity enforced by TXT is critical for both the WP
bit and other logic such as the page fault handler.
HyperSentry [7] proposes hypervisor-unaware integrity
checks (to prevent a scrubbing attack where a compromised
hypervisor hides the compromise from the monitor). The
triggering logic is located in SMRAM as SMI handlers, but
the core checking logic runs outside. To address the checking
logic’s lack of access to VM state information, the authors
came up with a fallback mechanism with two consecutive
SMIs that ensures landing in the VMX root mode. The
Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) is used as
out-of-band signalling to trigger SMIs. HyperSentry assumes
proper SMRAM protection from BIOS, in the form of trusted
boot (S-CRTM) with TPM alone, instead of DRTM with
TXT/SVM.
HyperGuard [106] and HyperCheck [119] are two other
examples of using SMM for hypervisor integrity. The dif-
ference is that HyperCheck outsources the core logic to the
network (a remote machine), with the network card driver also
in SMRAM; whereas HyperGuard collaborates with a chipset-
based mechanism DeepWatch [15] (a trustlet in Intel ME).
Both assume proper firmware protection (e.g., initial SMRAM
integrity).
Guest OS integrity: CloudVisor [139] protects the integrity
of VM guests under the threat of compromised hypervisors. It
also relies on TXT/SVM to ensure clean initialization. Then
it provides a tiny security monitor using nested virtualization
(equivalent to a lower-level VMM) to enforce isolation and
protection of resources used by each VM guest. Sensitive
operations such as NPT/EPT faults, critical instructions and
I/O are trapped and examined by the tiny security monitor.
Usage 2: Monitor directly from concurrent pTEE. A
concurrent pTEE can also be used to host an monitor, which
directly monitors the OS/VMM without the help of an inter-
mediary like SMM. Such a combined solution is not possible
on x86 since the Attested TEEs on x86 are either unprivileged
(uTEEs like SGX) and thus cannot monitor an OS/VMM, or
switching is too expensive (exclusive pTEEs like TXT/SVM).
The advantage of ARM TrustZone is that it is privileged
and concurrent ( having low switch overhead as a result)
at the same time. Examples of this usage are TZ-RKP [6]
(which led to Samsung KNOX) and SPROBES [41] to protect
kernel integrity (in the normal world) by handling critical
kernel events in the secure world. In both systems, kernel
binary rewriting is needed to replace sensitive instructions
with invocation of the Secure Monitor Call (SMC, a mode
for switching to the secure world), which will invoke the
TrustZone monitor.
Usage 3: Containerization/isolation (TrustZone, SGX and
SMM). Thanks to TEEs’ addressing restrictions and mem-
ory protection (see Table I), they become a good candidate
for containerization or isolation enforcement. While low-cost
software sandboxes exist [9], [132], a hardware-backed TEE
can be “root-secure”, meaning that they can withstand an
adversary who has privileged code access (i.e. control of OS
or hypervisor).
Considering that there currently exist no fine-grained (i.e.,
unprivileged) secure application environments in the normal
world on ARM, Sun et al. propose TrustICE [112]. Multiple
isolated computing environments (ICEs, similar to Intel SGX
enclaves) can be created in the normal world, managed by
a trusted domain controller (TDC) in the TrustZone secure
world.
In an effort to peel the host OS or hypervisor off the
TCB, but accommodate secure workloads in parallel, SICE [8]
employs SMM to create and manage enclave-like isolated
computing environments (aka. ICEs). It supports two modes:
time-sharing (legacy host and ICEs run alternately) and multi-
core (dedicated cores for ICEs). The latter takes advantage
of SMM’s per-core exclusiveness. Note that SICE only uses
SMRAM as a shelter to store the ICEs (up to 4GB); SMM as a
mode only prepares and enters the isolated environment, with
the ICE code running in regular protected mode. As with the
use of TrustZone, in SICE the legacy host (e.g., the hypervisor)
is still required to add an interface that invokes an SMI to
trigger SICE.
Scotch [75] combines a uTEE (i.e., SGX) and SMM to
achieve reliable Hypervisor resource accounting, using both
SGX and SMM as isolation mechanisms. The strong pre-
emptiveness of SMIs is used to forward all necessary events
(interrupts and hypercalls) to SMM where secure accounting
code runs and results can be communicated to and stored in
the guest-side SGX space.
We can also consider lifting privileged code into uTEEs for
finer granularity, as is done by Richter et al. [104] in porting
certain OS components to SGX. In addition to containerization
for protection granularity, SGX’s strengths over pTEEs are
also important for the OS, e.g., immunity to SMM attacks and
encryption against memory attacks. To showcase the benefits
and feasibility, they have adapted the encryption module
dm-crypt and move it to the SGX enclaves. The limited
number of eligible components and huge performance loss
may hinder its adoptability.
Apart from the TEEs above, researchers also pay attention
to underused x86 privileges (currently only Ring 0 for kernel
space and Ring 3 for userspace) to form intermediate protec-
tion for sensitive user-space tasks. LOTRx86 [77] is proposed
for such a purpose. It defines a new mode (PrivUser) run in
Ring2-x32 and uses Ring 1 as a Gate mode in and out of
the PrivUser mode. Sensitive per-application operations (e.g.,
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operations related to memory safety) can be harnessed at a
privilege higher than the rest of the application but still lower
than the OS, hence ensuring mutual security.
Usage 4: Secure user-machine interaction. As mentioned
in Section I, trustworthy execution also involves secure data
exchange with the human user or peripherals, besides external
malicious code and internal buggy code. If data input/output
is intercepted, the execution logic’s correctness alone is no
longer leading to trustworthiness.
Exclusive pTEE without I/O partitioning: If the attested TEE
cannot be assured that untrusted code does not have access to
peripherals, it has to be exclusive to achieve secure user inter-
action. Secure user input is usually considered together with
what the user sees/perceives (i.e., secure output), UTP [39]
hooks pre-configured user data entry events/transactions, such
as confirming an online purchase. It redirects the user to
an attested TEE session (TXT/SVM reusing the Flicker [86]
framework) to see a simplified display of the transaction,
takes user input (confirmation) from the keyboard, and sends
the attested two pieces of information to the server. The
OS is resumed after such a session. In this case, both the
physical keyboard and display are occupied by TXT/SVM
because of its exclusiveness, hence considered secure. Very
similarly, Bumpy [87] also makes use of TXT/SVM with
Flicker to protect user keyboard/mouse inputs. It involves
more components for better usability and security: a USB
interposer (an ARM board that could be later integrated to
the keyboard/mouse) and a Trusted Monitor (a smartphone).
A keystroke is encrypted by the USB interposer, processed and
verified by the Flicker session, user-confirmed on the Trusted
Monitor and sent to the server.
TrustLogin [137] employs SMM to secure password-based
login with a novel method of short-circuiting the OS, i.e., in-
tercepting keyboard activities (source) and NIC packets (sink).
Considering trusted display alone, Yu et al. propose an attested
TEE+GPU approach [134] that introduces a microhypervisor-
managed GPU separation kernel to serve the unmodified
OS/applications and the secure applications at the same time.
They employ XMHF [118] as the microhypervisor with the
TrustVisor [85] extension, which uses TXT/SVM for initial
integrity.
With I/O partitioning: On ARM platforms, secure user
interaction seems to have attracted more attention, possibly
due to the rich sensor environment and highly personal data
storage. As mentioned in Section III-A, TrustZone has I/O
partitioning capability with its Protection Controller (TZPC) or
TrustZone Address Space Controller (TZASC). This provides
two important advantages: 1) It ensures exclusive resource
access. Because of partitioning, even outside TrustZone, the
normal world still cannot access the protected resource. 2) The
allocation of I/O resources between the secure and normal
worlds can be changed dynamically.
• User interaction. TruZ-Droid [133] proposes to move
the sensitive UI interaction into the TrustZone secure
world, while still maintaining the binding between the UI
interaction and normal-world app code through indirect
references (server-side). The user enters sensitive data and
confirms transactions only with the Trusted Applications
(TAs) in the secure world, discernible with a hardware
Indicator LED. A similar approach is applied by Trus-
tUI [80], which also provides a trusted path between
the user and the mobile device using input and display
randomization. Both proposals rely on the TZPC.
• Peripheral/sensor management. SeCloak [79] is designed
to securely and verifiably place the device in a user-
approved state (on/off). It leverages both TZASC (as
secure memory of the s-kernel) and Central Security Unit
(CSU, a custom TZPC).
It is obvious that since secure input/output concerns physical
I/O operations (privileged in almost all architectures), the
involved TEE/EE must also be privileged to perform any
checks.
VII. EXPOSING MORE FOR SECURITY
TEEs assume a model mainly with external threats which
are addressed by information hiding (abstraction). TEE-based
security solutions achieve trustworthy execution by ensuring
that no code or data tampering from outside can slip through.
However, except for certain simple programs that can be
formally verified, software bugs almost become a destined
byproduct in pursuit of higher performance and lower software
development costs. If the programs are not written in type-
safe languages [90], attackers may feed malicious inputs to
exploit some of the dangerous bugs to corrupt or subvert the
programs [113]. Another complicating factor is that software
per se is not monolithic; user-level programs may load third
party libraries, similar to operating systems loading drivers.
The code available for inspection may only end up occupying
a small portion at run time, and loading a buggy component
may result in the entire program to be vulnerable. Conse-
quently, TEEs may not be able to defend against such internal
misbehavior.
What is worse, software misbehavior is hard to efficiently
address in an either software-only or hardware-only manner
alone. Due to the growing complexity of software, instru-
mented code introduces significant performance overhead,
e.g., as in EffectiveSan [32] and WPBOUND [131] (instru-
mentation is necessary to expose execution metadata). On
the other hand, it is almost impossible for hardware alone
to distinguish correct execution from misbehaved execution.
Software semantics like buffer bound, data type, or dynamic
allocation is hidden above the software-hardware interface
(i.e., the ISA). This situation is very similar to the abstraction
overdone as discussed in Section V, which can be alleviated
by exposing more across the interface (decreasing abstraction).
Exposing more across the ISA interface effectively leads
to software-hardware collaboration in addressing intra-EE
misbehavior. We note that many of these solutions are not
TEE specific, and can be applied to any EE, trustworthy or
not. However, they can be applied to TEEs to significantly
increase the assurance that the software in the TEE is free of
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internal misbehavior. Corresponding solutions usually fall into
two categories based on the information flow direction:
1) Hardware-to-software (execution metadata). The hard-
ware feature passively collects information from the
execution trace of the monitored code, and sends it to
a monitoring component to detect misbehavior.
2) Software-to-hardware (application semantics). The hard-
ware feature learns application semantics from the mon-
itored code through certain hints (explicitly like new
instructions or registers or implicitly as in µCFI [52]),
and stops the execution when specified rules are violated.
Control/data-flow attacks and other memory safety problems
have been systematically studied [113] in the literature. We
do not repeat the discussion (e.g., the taxonomy of memory
attacks) and consider them all as intra-EE misbehavior.
Software-hardware collaboration usually involves a mon-
itoring component that assists the local hardware for poli-
cy/metadata management. Its implementation can range from
local software for simplicity, a remote server for flexibility,
to dedicated hardware for performance. For instance, Lite-
HAX [28] is a remote monitoring and attestation scheme
against both control-flow and data-only attacks on embedded
devices, which uses a remote computer for analysis. In the case
of local software monitoring component, we assume proper
isolation/protection from the monitored code, as is addressed
by TEE-based approaches.
1) Hardware-to-software: Hardware passively collects ex-
ecution metadata in collaboration with its monitoring com-
ponent. Note that hardware involvement is required here as
the monitored code is not trusted to provide such metadata
and other software has no access to it. As the monitored code
does not need to cooperate, an advantage of the hardware-to-
software approach is backward compatibility, allowing unin-
strumented original code to be monitored.
Coarse-grain control flow integrity with existing hardware.
The ISA typically provides dedicated instructions to perform
indirect control flow change (e.g., call or ret), and thus
hardware can infer control flow information directly, assuming
that most programs use these instructions in the intended
way. For example, the Last Branch Record (LBR) registers
store a limited amount of trace information, as is used by
ROPecker [21] and kBouncer [102] against Return Oriented
Programming (ROP) attacks. They rely on patterns of control
flow change as the attack signature, as well as looking for sus-
picious short code sequences as an artifact of ROP. Similarly,
the Intel Processor Tracing (PT) also provides activity traces
but with more details and control. GRIFFIN [40] uses Intel PT
to enforce both forward-edge and backward-edge control-flow
integrity.
Limitations of execution metadata without application
semantics. Metadata other than control flow is usually not
retrievable with the existing ISA, e.g., data access information.
While modified hardware can catch such metadata, it is still
insufficient for data-oriented attack mitigation without appli-
cation semantics. For example, ARMOR [45] (an approach
to ensure data accesses within the allocated ranges) cannot
confine each access to the intended object due to lack of
semantic information.
Monitoring privileged software.. Critical data structures in
OS/VMM tend to be more deterministic for hardware to
monitor without per-application semantics. Kernel integrity
monitor solutions are typical of such type, e.g., Copilot [63]
(periodical entire memory scanning with a PCI card), Vig-
ilare [92] (bus traffic snooping), KI-Mon [76] (monitoring
with a co-processor) and MGuard [83] (using both a modified
DRAM module and a co-processor).
2) Software-to-hardware: While hardware-to-software ab-
straction reduction preserves backward compatibility, limited
application semantics becomes the major hurdle when better
coverage or precision is needed. Therefore, exposing more
semantic information from software to hardware becomes
helpful. Instead of directly from the monitored code, this
is usually done by a dedicated software component (e.g.,
a compiler) instrumenting the monitored code to expose its
semantics (although programmer annotation is also seen). The
ISA is augmented with new instructions and/or registers.
Precise control flow integrity with application semantics.
With valid code pointers marked by the monitored code,
misbehaving execution that jumps to an unexpected address
can be more easily identified. Intel CET [60] is a complete CFI
defense for all privilege levels. For forward-edge protection,
CET introduces a new instruction ENDBRANCH to mark valid
indirect control transfer destinations, and the processor uses
state machines to ensure proper indirect branch landing. A
traditional shadow stack is used for backward-edge protection.
HAFIX [25] is based on the observation that a function cannot
return if it is not called yet, targeting coarse-grained back-edge
control flow protection. Each function is assigned a unique
label (marking start and end) and tracked with dedicated label
state memory. New instructions are introduced to update the
label state.
Memory access control using an application policy.
In hardware-to-software solutions to data-oriented attacks,
memory requests are coarsely categorized as instruction fetch,
load, and store, and bad requests can slip through if the page
table entry permits it. With an augmented ISA, software now
can express its semantics in a way that hardware understands,
e.g., object bounds and types. Hardware can use specialized
logic to accelerate costly metadata maintenance and policy
check. Hardbound [29] is based on fat pointers for memory
safety. Pointers in the monitored code are extended with a base
and bound address pair, allowing hardware to perform bound
checks upon each memory access. The compiler and run-time
library instrument the monitored code with new instructions
to manage bounds. Shakti-T [89] introduces another level of
indirection to reduce the overhead of fat pointer bound loading.
Instead of carrying pointer bounds with pointers, they carry
indices of pointer bounds, and all pointers having the same
index will share a pointer bound. HardScope [99] shifts from
object bounds to enforcing language variable scoping. A rule
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stack is maintained by hardware and the compiler instruments
the monitored code with new instructions to manage rules.
Similar approaches are also applied on COTS computers, e.g.,
Intel MPX [100], MPK [115] and ARM Pointer Authentication
(which PARTS [81] is built on).
Information Flow Tracking with tagged memory. Metadata
tags can be associated with memory locations to track dynamic
information flow. Tags are propagated by hardware at run-time
according to configured policies and anomalies are reacted
to also based on policies. Such policies can be specified
statically as in Raksha [24] and SDMP [30], e.g., control-
flow graph (CFG) passed in at compile time. Also, new
instructions/registers can be introduced to the ISA so that
policies can be passed in at run-time with better accuracy and
granularity, as in HDFI [111]. Loki [136] is a similar approach
but aims to offload access control enforcement to hardware for
OS kernels. Security labels of kernel objects are translated into
tags by a small trusted monitor and checks are enforced by
hardware on each memory access.
3) Software participation in metadata management: While
exposing application semantics to hardware is sufficient in
most cases, the isolation between the monitored code and
hardware-maintained metadata is a double-edged sword. On
one hand, it ensures the integrity of metadata even after
compromise. On the other hand, hardware must implement
all metadata maintenance operations, which can be costly in
terms of performance or chip area for hardware. Moreover,
certain high-level security policies (e.g. data freshness or
confidentiality) may require software support to enforce.
For such participation, dedicated logic is added to the mon-
itored code ranging from compiler-instrumented instructions
to full-fledged run-time libraries exposing developer APIs.
In this case, extra care is needed for metadata protection
as to how it is isolated from potentially vulnerable code.
Watchdog [95] uses a traditional fat pointer scheme for spatial
memory safety, and a lock-and-key approach for temporal
memory safety, where each object is associated with a lock,
and only pointers with a matching key can dereference the
object. Checks and metadata propagation are performed by
hardware (there is also the software-only WatchdogLite [96]
using compiler instrumentation). Low-fat Pointers [73] is a fat
pointer scheme that uses compressed pointer bound encoding
to make it fit into the unused portion of a pointer address.
It requires software to place allocated objects properly so that
pointer bounds can be efficiently encoded, and encoded pointer
bounds are naturally part of pointer values, both in register and
in memory. This design avoids the extra memory overhead of
pointer bounds, and allows hardware to perform bound check
in parallel during pointer dereference.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Relationship between Firmware TEEs. One observation we
have made is that many firmware TEEs are co-dependent on
each other, yet are poorly isolated from each other. While
the abstractions between hardware and software create well-
defined interfaces, there are no such abstractions between
hardware components, a category in which firmware com-
ponents are also often arbitrarily swept under. To illustrate
this complexity, consider how the Intel ME [105] is blocked
from accessing both SMRAM and Intel TXT, as the ME
environment has a large TCB and many vectors over which it
can be attacked.
Also, the TCBs of most attested TEEs include the firmware
TEEs. The original positioning of DRTM (Intel TXT and
AMD SVM) was to remove the need for a long chain of
trust in SRTM (which included the BIOS for example). DRTM
alleviates this by allowing the start fresh with a minimal TCB
after boot (the CPU and optionally a tiny authorized module),
which can measure and launch a new VMM/OS—hence the
name “late launch”.
However, DRTM’s TCB does include other firmware (see
TCG’s DRTM Architecture [46]). For example, SMM is
not measured by DRTM for initial integrity, which is why
SMI handlers compromised before entering TXT [126] could
evade DRTM detection and thus take over the whole system
(STM [129] is intended to address this). One of Intel SGX’s
design motivations for running only unprivileged code again
was TCB reduction [57], i.e. to exclude BIOS/UEFI as well as
the OS/VMM. However, even SGX still depends on CPU mi-
crocode, another firmware TEE that is a potentially subvertable
component. Furthermore, certain SGX components reside in
ME as a trustlet, e.g., the later-added monotonic counter [105].
There have been attempts to add interfaces between firmware
components to compartmentalize them. One example of this is
the SMI Transfer Monitor (STM) [56], which limits the trust
that other components must have in the SMI handlers. While
STM cannot be considered a full abstraction and still requires
trust in other firmware TEEs, it at least reduces the attack
surface for those firmware TEEs.
Towards greater openness. A significant difference between
firmware environments and Attested TEEs is that Attested
TEEs are intended for users to deploy custom code, while
firmware TEEs are not exposed to users or even software
developers (refer to column Dev in Table I). This means that
the firmware TEEs are largely undocumented, though this
naturally does not mean they are any more inherently secure
than open TEEs. This leads to opportunities for research.
Some of this research leads to changes to improve security,
such as SMRR [59]. As another example, the group of
Koppe and Kollenda have used reverse engineered microcode
to change the behavior of earlier CPU models (specifically
AMD K8 and K10) [70], [71]. An interesting direction for
this line of work is the standardization of firmware access,
which could lead to greater customization and modification of
hardware [70].
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We explain the perceived advantages/disadvantages of hard-
ware security features, and the root cause of the notorious
low-level attacks (firmware or side-channel), using the concept
of abstraction, which is ubiquitous in computing. We find
that abstraction either underdone or overdone can lead to
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vulnerabilities, many of which have commonalities across
various TEEs. We draw a lesson that future researchers and
secure hardware designers may do well to examine their
abstractions, not just for ease of programmability, maintenance
and performance, but for whether they are fulfilling their
security requirements in terms of the information flows they
allow.
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APPENDIX
To facilitate understanding of Table II, a brief introduction
to the acronyms and terms used is provided as follows.
A. Glossary
Processor Units:
SAP: System Assist Processor.
zIIP: Integrated Information Processor.
IFP: Integrated Firmware Processor.
IFL: Integrated Facility for Linux.
ICF: Internal Coupling Facility.
Stand-alone components:
CU: Control Unit. A CU consolidates device-specific logic
and circuitry and acts as a hub between the main system and
multiple devices of the same type.
CSS: Channel Subsystem. I/O operations are offloaded to
the CSS (saving the main processors from waiting), allowing
the handling of massive numbers of concurrent transactions.
The CSS runs on a dedicated processor SAP (System Assist
Processor). It is comparable to the SouthBridge on an x86
motherboard but more full-fledged and stand-alone.
SE: Support Element. SE has the lowest-level access to
mainframe processors via the processor interconnect network.
It is a console as the single-point-of-control to the mainframe.
The SE takes the physical form of a Thinkpad laptop.
HMC: Hardware Management Console is a hardware ap-
pliance with which various configuration and administrative
operations can be performed. It can be emulated with a Web
application on a PC.
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B. Additional Information on TEEs of Different Platforms
sFW on ARM. Due to the diversity of ARM platforms,
the implementation of individual SoCs (System-on-Chips) is
vendor-specific. This is exemplified by bootloaders, e.g., Sam-
sung S3 had PBL loading SBL1, SBL2 and SBL3, followed
by ABOOT [50].
sFW on mainframes. As an example among many other
firmware TEEs, PR/SM (Processor Resource/System Man-
ager) is a type-1 hypervisor implemented as firmware capable
of directly partitioning physical processors, memory and I/O
channels.
Applications on co-processors. Intel ME has become a plat-
form for deployment of security-critical applications therein
(trustlets). The same applies to AMD PSP (Platform Secu-
rity Processor), or AMD Secure Processor, as well, omit-
ted here for brevity. Examples include Active Manageability
Technology (AMT) for out-of-band remote access, Protected
Audio/Video Path (PAVP) and firmware-based TPM (fTPM).
Examples are not provided for the baseband processor,
Apple Secure Enclave Processor, System Control Processor
(SCP) and Manageability Control Processor (MCP), for the
same diversity reason in sFW.
18
